The felt-presence experience: from cognition to the clinic.

The felt presence experience is the basic feeling that someone else is present in the immediate environment, without clear sensory evidence. Ranging from benevolent to distressing, personified to ambiguous, felt presence has been observed in neurological case studies and within psychosis and paranoia, associated with sleep paralysis and anxiety, and recorded within endurance sports and spiritualist communities. In this Review, we summarise the philosophical, phenomenological, clinical, and non-clinical correlates of felt presence, as well as current approaches that use psychometric, cognitive, and neurophysiological methods. We present current mechanistic explanations for felt presence, suggest a unifying cognitive framework for the phenomenon, and discuss outstanding questions for the field. Felt presence offers a sublime opportunity to understand the cognitive neuroscience of own-body awareness and social agency detection, as an intuitive, but poorly understood, experience in health and disorder.

Mirror movements and callosal dysgenesis in a family with a DCC mutation: Neuropsychological and neuroimaging outcomes.

Corpus callosum dysgenesis is a congenital abnormality whereby the corpus callosum fails to develop normally, and has been associated with a range of neuropsychological outcomes. One specific finding in some individuals with corpus callosum dysgenesis is "congenital mirror movement disorder", which is the presence of involuntary movements on one side of the body that mimic voluntary movements of the other side. Mirror movements have also been associated with mutations in the deleted in colorectal carcinoma (DCC) gene. The current study aims to comprehensively document the neuropsychological outcomes and neuroanatomical mapping of a family (a mother, daughter and son) with known DCC mutations. All three family members experience mirror movements, and the son additionally has partial agenesis of the corpus callosum (pACC). All family members underwent extensive neuropsychological testing, spanning general intellectual functioning, memory, language, literacy, numeracy, psychomotor speed, visuospatial perception, praxis and motor functioning, executive functioning, attention, verbal/nonverbal fluency, and social cognition. The mother and daughter had impaired memory for faces, and reduced spontaneous speech, and the daughter demonstrated scattered impairments in attention and executive functioning, but their neuropsychological abilities were largely within normal limits. By contrast, the son showed areas of significant impairment across multiple domains including reduced psychomotor speed, fine motor dexterity and general intellectual functioning, and he was profoundly impaired across areas of executive functioning and attention. Reductions in his verbal/non-verbal fluency, with relatively intact core language, resembled dynamic frontal aphasia. His relative strengths included aspects of memory and he demonstrated largely sound theory of mind. Neuroimaging revealed an asymmetric sigmoid bundle in the son, connecting, via the callosal remnant, the left frontal cortex with contralateral parieto-occipital cortex. Overall, this study documents a range of neuropsychological and neuroanatomical outcomes within one family with DCC mutations and mirror movements, including one with more severe consequences and pACC.

Formalising social representation to explain psychiatric symptoms.

Recent work in social cognition has moved beyond a focus on how people process social rewards to examine how healthy people represent other agents and how this is altered in psychiatric disorders. However, formal modelling of social representation has not kept pace with these changes, impeding our understanding of how core aspects of social cognition function, and fail, in psychopathology. Here, we suggest that belief-based computational models provide a basis for an integrated sociocognitive approach to psychiatry, with the potential to address important but unexamined pathologies of social representation, such as maladaptive schemas and illusory social agents.

Increased persuadability and credulity in people with corpus callosum dysgenesis.

Corpus callosum dysgenesis is one of the most common congenital neurological malformations. Despite being a clear and identifiable structural alteration of the brain's white matter connectivity, the impact of corpus callosum dysgenesis on cognition and behaviour has remained unclear. Here we build upon past clinical observations in the literature to define the clinical phenotype of corpus callosum dysgenesis better using unadjusted and adjusted group differences compared with a neurotypical sample on a range of social and cognitive measures that have been previously reported to be impacted by a corpus callosum dysgenesis diagnosis. Those with a diagnosis of corpus callosum dysgenesis (n = 22) demonstrated significantly higher persuadability, credulity, and insensitivity to social trickery than neurotypical (n = 86) participants, after controlling for age, sex, education, autistic-like traits, social intelligence, and general cognition. To explore this further, we examined the covariance structure of our psychometric variables using a machine learning algorithm trained on a neurotypical dataset. The algorithm was then used to test whether these dimensions possessed the capability to discriminate between a test-set of neurotypical and corpus callosum dysgenesis participants. After controlling for age and sex, and with Leave-One-Out-Cross-Validation across 250 training-set bootstrapped iterations, we found that participants with a diagnosis of corpus callosum dysgenesis were best classed within dimension space along the same axis as persuadability, credulity, and insensitivity to social trickery, with a mean accuracy of 71.7%. These results have implications for a) the characterisation of corpus callosum dysgenesis, and b) the role of the corpus callosum in social inference.

The computational relationship between reinforcement learning, social inference, and paranoia.

Theoretical accounts suggest heightened uncertainty about the state of the world underpin aberrant belief updates, which in turn increase the risk of developing a persecutory delusion. However, this raises the question as to how an agent's uncertainty may relate to the precise phenomenology of paranoia, as opposed to other qualitatively different forms of belief. We tested whether the same population (n = 693) responded similarly to non-social and social contingency changes in a probabilistic reversal learning task and a modified repeated reversal Dictator game, and the impact of paranoia on both. We fitted computational models that included closely related parameters that quantified the rigidity across contingency reversals and the uncertainty about the environment/partner. Consistent with prior work we show that paranoia was associated with uncertainty around a partner's behavioural policy and rigidity in harmful intent attributions in the social task. In the non-social task we found that pre-existing paranoia was associated with larger decision temperatures and commitment to suboptimal cards. We show relationships between decision temperature in the non-social task and priors over harmful intent attributions and uncertainty over beliefs about partners in the social task. Our results converge across both classes of model, suggesting paranoia is associated with a general uncertainty over the state of the world (and agents within it) that takes longer to resolve, although we demonstrate that this uncertainty is expressed asymmetrically in social contexts. Our model and data allow the representation of sociocognitive mechanisms that explain persecutory delusions and provide testable, phenomenologically relevant predictions for causal experiments.

Cognitive deficits in people who have recovered from COVID-19.

BACKGROUND: There is growing concern about possible cognitive consequences of COVID-19, with reports of 'Long COVID' symptoms persisting into the chronic phase and case studies revealing neurological problems in severely affected patients. However, there is little information regarding the nature and broader prevalence of cognitive problems post-infection or across the full spread of disease severity. METHODS: We sought to confirm whether there was an association between cross-sectional cognitive performance data from 81,337 participants who between January and December 2020 undertook a clinically validated web-optimized assessment as part of the Great British Intelligence Test, and questionnaire items capturing self-report of suspected and confirmed COVID-19 infection and respiratory symptoms. FINDINGS: People who had recovered from COVID-19, including those no longer reporting symptoms, exhibited significant cognitive deficits versus controls when controlling for age, gender, education level, income, racial-ethnic group, pre-existing medical disorders, tiredness, depression and anxiety. The deficits were of substantial effect size for people who had been hospitalised (N = 192), but also for non-hospitalised cases who had biological confirmation of COVID-19 infection (N = 326). Analysing markers of premorbid intelligence did not support these differences being present prior to infection. Finer grained analysis of performance across sub-tests supported the hypothesis that COVID-19 has a multi-domain impact on human cognition. INTERPRETATION: Interpretation. These results accord with reports of 'Long Covid' cognitive symptoms that persist into the early-chronic phase. They should act as a clarion call for further research with longitudinal and neuroimaging cohorts to plot recovery trajectories and identify the biological basis of cognitive deficits in SARS-COV-2 survivors. FUNDING: Funding. AH is supported by the UK Dementia Research Institute Care Research and Technology Centre and Biomedical Research Centre at Imperial College London. WT is supported by the EPSRC Centre for Doctoral Training in Neurotechnology. SRC is funded by a Wellcome Trust Clinical Fellowship 110,049/Z/15/Z. JMB is supported by Medical Research Council (MR/N013700/1). MAM, SCRW and PJH are, in part, supported by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Biomedical Research Centre at South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust and King's College London.

Hallucination, imagery, dreaming: reassembling stimulus-independent perceptions based on Edmund Parish's classic misperception framework.

Within the broad field of human perception lies the category of stimulus-independent perceptions, which draws together experiences such as hallucinations, mental imagery and dreams. Traditional divisions between medical and psychological sciences have contributed to these experiences being investigated separately. This review aims to examine their similarities and differences at the levels of phenomenology and underlying brain function and thus reassemble them within a common framework. Using Edmund Parish's historical work as a guiding tool and the latest research findings in the cognitive, clinical and computational sciences, we consider how different perspectives may be reconciled and help generate novel hypotheses for future research. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.

Reduction in social learning and increased policy uncertainty about harmful intent is associated with pre-existing paranoid beliefs: Evidence from modelling a modified serial dictator game.

Current computational models suggest that paranoia may be explained by stronger higher-order beliefs about others and increased sensitivity to environments. However, it is unclear whether this applies to social contexts, and whether it is specific to harmful intent attributions, the live expression of paranoia. We sought to fill this gap by fitting a computational model to data (n = 1754) from a modified serial dictator game, to explore whether pre-existing paranoia could be accounted by specific alterations to cognitive parameters characterising harmful intent attributions. We constructed a 'Bayesian brain' model of others' intent, which we fitted to harmful intent and self-interest attributions made over 18 trials, across three different partners. We found that pre-existing paranoia was associated with greater uncertainty about other's actions. It moderated the relationship between learning rates and harmful intent attributions, making harmful intent attributions less reliant on prior interactions. Overall, the magnitude of harmful intent attributions was directly related to their uncertainty, and importantly, the opposite was true for self-interest attributions. Our results explain how pre-existing paranoia may be the result of an increased need to attend to immediate experiences in determining intentional threat, at the expense of what is already known, and more broadly, they suggest that environments that induce greater probabilities of harmful intent attributions may also induce states of uncertainty, potentially as an adaptive mechanism to better detect threatening others. Importantly, we suggest that if paranoia were able to be explained exclusively by core domain-general alterations we would not observe differential parameter estimates underlying harmful-intent and self-interest attributions.

Beliefs are multidimensional and vary in stability over time - psychometric properties of the Beliefs and Values Inventory (BVI).

The cognitive processes underlying belief are still obscure. Understanding these processes may lead to more targeted treatment to better address functional impairment, such as occurs with delusions. One way in which this might be accomplished is to understand healthy, everyday beliefs, and how these may relate to characteristics observed in delusions. As yet, no such measure exists to accurately measure belief across a range of themes and dimensions. This paper outlines two studies documenting the creation and psychometric properties of a novel measure assessing three different dimensions of belief across themes of politics, science, the paranormal, religion, and morality in UK samples (n = 1, 673 total). Reliability estimates suggested good to excellent consistency (alpha > 0.8 per theme) with moderate to excellent reliability at 48 h (ICC = 0.61 -0.96) and 3.5 months (ICC = 0.61 -0.89). Factor analyses suggested good support for our five chosen themes of belief, suggesting they are distinct topic areas. Correlations across theme and dimension suggested dissociable characteristics within themes. These results have implications for 1. understanding the stability and relationship between themes of belief in a population and, 2. exploring how beliefs may change over time or as a result of an intervention. Full analysis code and data are available from the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/hzvwr/).

The Sensed Presence Questionnaire (SenPQ): initial psychometric validation of a measure of the "Sensed Presence" experience.

BACKGROUND: The experience of 'sensed presence'-a feeling or sense that another entity, individual or being is present despite no clear sensory or perceptual evidence-is known to occur in the general population, appears more frequently in religious or spiritual contexts, and seems to be prominent in certain psychiatric or neurological conditions and may reflect specific functions of social cognition or body-image representation systems in the brain. Previous research has relied on ad-hoc measures of the experience and no specific psychometric scale to measure the experience exists to date. METHODS: Based on phenomenological description in the literature, we created the 16-item Sensed Presence Questionnaire (SenPQ). We recruited participants from (i) a general population sample, and; (ii) a sample including specific selection for religious affiliation, to complete the SenPQ and additional measures of well-being, schizotypy, social anxiety, social imagery, and spiritual experience. We completed an analysis to test internal reliability, the ability of the SenPQ to distinguish between religious and non-religious participants, and whether the SenPQ was specifically related to positive schizotypical experiences and social imagery. A factor analysis was also conducted to examine underlying latent variables. RESULTS: The SenPQ was found to be reliable and valid, with religious participants significantly endorsing more items than non-religious participants, and the scale showing a selective relationship with construct relevant measures. Principal components analysis indicates two potential underlying factors interpreted as reflecting 'benign' and 'malign' sensed presence experiences. DISCUSSION: The SenPQ appears to be a reliable and valid measure of sensed presence experience although further validation in neurological and psychiatric conditions is warranted.

How similar are the changes in neural activity resulting from mindfulness practice in contrast to spiritual practice?

Meditation and spiritual practices are conceptually similar, eliciting similar subjective experiences, and both appear to provide similar benefits to the practicing individuals. However, no research has examined whether the mechanism of action leading to the beneficial effects is similar in both practices. This review examines the neuroimaging research that has focused on groups of meditating individuals, groups who engage in religious/spiritual practices, and research that has examined groups who perform both practices together, in an attempt to assess whether this may be the case. Differences in the balance of activity between the parietal and prefrontal cortical activation were found between the three groups. A relative prefrontal increase was reflective of mindfulness, which related to decreased anxiety and improved well-being. A relative decrease in activation of the parietal cortex, specifically the inferior parietal cortex, appears to be reflective of spiritual belief, whether within the context of meditation or not. Because mindful and spiritual practices differ in focus regarding the 'self' or 'other' (higher being), these observations about neurological components that reflect spirituality may continue work towards understanding how the definition of 'self' and 'other' is represented in the brain, and how this may be reflected in behaviour. Future research can begin to use cohorts of participants in mindfulness studies which are controlled for using the variable of spirituality to explicitly examine how functional and structural similarities and differences may arise.